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Abstract 
This essay offers some new perspectives on affinities between the writing and thought of 
Percy Shelley and Jacques Lacan, focusing on aspects of Lacanian psychoanalysis sometimes 
identified as “tragic”: especially its notions of the divided subject, and of that subject’s 
alienation by language. It first explores parallels between these notions and Shelley’s 
representations of language in Julian and Maddalo. Developing this, by engaging with 
deconstructive and psychoanalytic approaches to history and language in “The Triumph of 
Life,” it then highlights how Shelley and Lacan each seem to endorse a similar pessimism, a 
tragic perspective on our efforts to achieve self-understanding, and on human knowledge and 
potential more widely. Drawing on Fredric Jameson’s reflections on Marxism and 
psychoanalysis, and on his interpretation of Lacan’s concept of the “Real,” the essay then 
concludes by bringing Shelley and Lacan into a more positive, politically energizing 
encounter with one another, via a reading of Prometheus Unbound. 
 
Paul Fry’s suggestion, in 1979, that Shelley’s poetry and prose contain a “Lacanian 
psycholinguistics in embryo” (451) has seen follow in its wake a number of interpretations of 
Shelley drawing on Lacanian ideas. Understandably, given the nature of Lacan’s theories and 
2 
 
of the popular currency they have enjoyed in literary studies, the majority of these have in 
their various ways focused on language and the construction of subjectivity and identity in 
Shelley’s works. Certain of these works share much, arguably on the level of form as well as 
thematically, with the well-rehearsed, basic Lacanian narrative of the foundation of the 
individual subject upon “lack”: a process of alienation from a pre-verbal, in Lacan’s terms 
Imaginary sense of plenitude and oneness, set in motion by the “shattering of the Innenwelt to 
Umwelt circle” in the Hegelian “drama” of the mirror stage (Lacan Écrits 6), ending in our 
initiation into the Symbolic order—the order of language and laws, into which we must all 
enter, and where we live of necessity with our impossible desire for an inaccessible Other. In 
his influential study of Shelley’s Process, Jerrold Hogle suggests as much, when he writes 
that “There is simply no construction of an identifiable self in Shelley without a specific 
counterpart (a person or environment or symbolic order) helping to form that self’s structure 
and possibilities in a mirror” (98). Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi agrees, finding in Shelley’s 
poems “a subjectivity haunted by / mirroring Other(s) who have the character of specters,” 
and stating that “This shared epistemology, along with shared fascination in the links between 
subjectivity and language, makes Lacanian theory particularly applicable to Shelley’s work” 
(x). As Fry hinted, Lacanian analysis of Shelley can work well in large part because he and 
Lacan share some of these fundamental concerns with identity, with the process of its 
construction out of experiences of difference and otherness, and of the role of language in this 
process, which, as we will see, Shelley represents at times as enslaving and alienating, and as 
potentially liberating. It is Lacan’s approaches to these subjects and concepts that have led 
some to characterize his thought as “tragic.” Indeed, Lacan himself suggested the aptness of 
this term, with its weight of literary-cultural meaning and significance, to describe his 
theories: for instance, in the final part of his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 
entitled “The Tragic Dimension of Psychoanalytic Experience,” in which he discusses certain 
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premises and assumptions of psychoanalytic theory and practice, by way of an interpretation 
of Sophocles’ Antigone and Oedipus. With reference to this seminar and to other of Lacan’s 
writings, in the first and second sections of the essay, I explore some of Shelley’s works with 
respect to what Sean Homer has called “the tragedy of [Lacanian] psychoanalysis”: the 
difficult confrontation it compels us to enter into, with the notion of a human “subject [that] 
is inherently divided and can never be satisfied” (104). The first section reads Julian and 
Maddalo in relation to an aspect of this tragic vision to which Fredric Jameson draws 
particular attention, Lacan’s emphasis on our “unavoidable alienation by language” (Jameson 
Ideologies 91). The second section then engages with Paul de Man’s deconstructive, and Joel 
Faflak’s psychoanalytic approaches to history and language in “The Triumph of Life,” to 
show how Shelley and Lacan each seem to endorse a similar pessimism, a tragic perspective 
on our efforts to achieve self-understanding, and on human knowledge and potential more 
widely, which haunts certain of their writings, including these poems by Shelley. In 
examining this, I hope to suggest some ways in which such intersections between Shelley and 
Lacan might provide the opportunity for some immanent critical reflections upon the ideas of 
both, highlighting problems and contradictions in the thought of each, but also pointing, 
speculatively, to some ways beyond them. Jameson’s thinking about Lacan will be important 
to this (as he is for my analyses generally), especially his interpretation of Lacan’s concept of 
the “Real.” This will help us to make connections between some of these more pessimistic 
and negative, “tragic” aspects of Shelley’s and Lacan’s thought, in terms of which they can 
fruitfully be compared, and a different view of their shared concerns, especially of the 
political implications of their ideas and writings. The final section of the essay provides one 
such view, bringing Shelley and Lacan into a more positive, politically energizing encounter 
with one another, via a reading of Prometheus Unbound.  
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Tragedy and language in Julian and Maddalo  
Julian and Maddalo, I would suggest, is structured at once as a form of, and as a critical  
reflection upon, its own status as a tragedy of proto-Lacanian dimensions—and as an 
exploration in particular of our alienation by the language we must come to inhabit in order to 
realize ourselves as subjects. Contrasting his own approach with Freud’s, Lacan states that 
“Psychoanalysis should be the study of language inhabited by the subject. From the Freudian 
point of view man is the subject captured and tortured by language” (Psychoses 243). In 
Julian and the Maniac, Shelley creates two characters whose relationships to language bear 
striking resemblances to these Lacanian and Freudian positions, the Maniac’s utterances in 
particular foregrounding his sense of alienation and imprisonment by language. We see this 
most clearly in the Maniac’s struggles with “words”: 
    “How vain 
Are words! I thought never to speak again,  
Not even in secret,—not to my own heart— 
But from my lips the unwilling accents start 
And from my pen the words flow as I write, 
Dazzling my eyes with scalding tears . . . my sight 
Is dim to see that charactered in vain 
On this unfeeling leaf which burns the brain 
And eats into it . . . Blotting all things fair  
And wise and good which time had written there. (472-81) 
 
The Maniac’s “thought” never to speak again, not even to his own heart—to refuse language 
itself, written and spoken communication, even that of his own personal, interior dialogue—
is akin to a wish to renounce one’s very subjectivity, and he thus appears here as a kind of 
Romantic-Lacanian Ivan Karamazov, contemplating handing back his ticket to Lacan’s 
Symbolic order. This is, however, an impossible desire, in Lacanian terms: it is a wish 
effectively to become psychotic, a becoming we cannot set in motion for ourselves, even if 
we wanted to. Such psychosis is caused, for Lacan, by what he calls a “foreclosure” 
(Verwerfung) of castration, of “the paternal metaphor,” in the subject, a foreclosure which is 
“primordial” (Écrits 210), preceding Symbolic integration, rooted way back in the formation 
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of the unconscious. Rejecting language in the Maniac’s way would mean, in part, consciously 
setting in motion the situation in which, “By rejecting the psychic split from the (m)Other” 
essential to the subject’s Symbolic ordering, “the psychotic personality retains a sense of self-
totality: a lack of lack” (Ragland-Sullivan 156), a state in which this personality therefore 
lacks desire itself, is self-enclosed, needs and wants for nothing external to itself. Thus a 
“gain of psychosis,” as Ellie Ragland-Sullivan puts it, might be that the subject is able to 
deny “the ‘truth’ of the human condition” (265)—a tragic truth, that the experience of such 
lack, and of the ever-renewing, impossible desire to overcome it, are basic conditions of the 
subject’s formation. The Maniac seems to long for such a “gain,” but cannot achieve it, and 
thus he experiences something more similar to the tragedy of psychoanalysis—of the divided 
subject and its alienation by the very language it needs to communicate with others—than to 
madness. Reflecting further on psychosis, Lacan claimed that “If the neurotic inhabits 
language, the psychotic is inhabited, possessed, by language” (Psychoses 250). The Maniac is 
not (quite) “psychotic” in Lacan’s understanding of this condition, though he clearly does 
think of himself as “possessed,” as well as “captured and tortured” by the language he is 
compelled to think, speak and write. The very fact that he can think, and articulate his 
problem, places him in a kind of limbo, this side of madness. He is not in control of the string 
of signifiers that thrust themselves upon him—he certainly is presented to us as lacking 
Julian’s urbane facility with them—but neither is he completely “inhabited” by them: his grip 
on reality, and on the language that orders his relationship to it, seems easily sufficient to 
allow him to describe the condition he finds himself in to Julian. This is an important part of 
the irony of this section of the poem, in which the Maniac apparently suffers much more from 
his imprisonment by “words,” than from his physical confinement, amongst the inarticulate 
“clap of tortured hands, / Fierce yells and howlings” (215-16) of the other inmates. We are 
asked to imagine that the language in which the Maniac expresses the violence, futility and 
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oppressiveness he associates with “words” is sophisticated and insightful, especially 
contrasted with these “Moans” and “shrieks” (218) surrounding him in the madhouse. It is 
thus comparable to the language of Julian himself, through whom it is filtered, and who 
presumably has ordered the “wild language” of the Maniac’s “grief” into language, “Such as 
in measure were called poetry” (541-42)—the words of the poem, which Julian writes. This 
poetic rendering may better express what was vital in the Maniac’s utterance—what so 
moves Julian and Maddalo about it—focusing its wildness into a form that renders it 
accessible to us; or perhaps Julian’s metric, rhymed civilizing of this utterance leaves us out 
of touch with its original, less ordered but more immediate, organic forcefulness. We cannot 
know, and this is one of the potential failures of communication that Julian’s writing of the 
poem risks, emphasised by his refusal to relate the full story of the Maniac and the “Lady” to 
“the cold world”—to us—at the poem’s ending.  
 In contrast with the Maniac, Julian is shown to occupy something akin to Lacan’s 
“neurotic” position: he is someone who “inhabits” language all too well, presumably wishing 
to use it in the cause of the reform he seeks; and who, confronted somewhat traumatically 
with its limits by the Maniac, now more anxiously inhabits “this earth, / Where there is little 
of transcendent worth” (590-91), his final inarticulacy hinting at the effects of this encounter 
upon his sense of the value of his own linguistic, narrative and poetic prowess. We must also 
remember that, as Julian is the poem’s sole narrator, we are imagining him recounting the 
Maniac’s (and everyone else’s) words, and so there are levels of irony to consider. Shelley 
makes us aware of the potential for the Utopia-talking Julian, whose rhetorical capacity and 
flare for the descriptive and conceptual is foregrounded, to slip over into a similar state: 
Maddalo first refers to the Maniac as “one like you [Julian] / Who to this city came some 
months ago,” who “is now gone mad” (195-98). This equivalence is supported by Kelvin 
Everest’s important reading of the poem, in which he observes that the Maniac’s “passionate 
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restatement of Julian’s radical creed,” which Julian has expressed earlier in the poem, is itself 
a “failure of communication,” showing up how “Julian’s own ideals are not mediated for his 
society,” consigning them finally “to an inarticulate limbo, like the madhouse” itself (678). 
With reference to Everest, William Keach has suggested that the Maniac’s speech can be read 
as “language that wants to function as sublime emotional music, and only sporadically exists 
as intelligible social and historical discourse.” For Keach, in representing this, Shelley is 
“confronting, not just idealizing or sentimentalizing, an impulse in his own writing [toward 
such a language] that for many readers, then as now, threatens or limits communication” (90). 
Julian and Maddalo thus turns upon a confrontation between the “social and historical 
discourse” that Shelley knows thinkers like Julian and himself must participate in, and the 
desire to escape it, into a “sublime” language of sheer immediacy, seemingly ideal, but which 
may in fact be solipsistic and so antithetical to the social and political causes it wants to 
support. (As we will see, some critics find the lyrical Act 4 of Prometheus Unbound 
problematic for similar reasons). Monika Lee observes, in the Maniac’s discourse, an 
“idealism and search for an utterance that transcends the boundaries of the linguistic 
medium” (qtd. in Weisman 413), which Lee sees as an instance of Shelley’s engagement with 
Rousseau, inspired by Julie especially. The Maniac’s soliloquy compares also with some of 
the gloomier reflections of the Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality 
Among Men (second Discourse)—which we know Shelley had read, from his reference to it 
in the notes to Queen Mab (1813)—for example, when Rousseau writes: 
I ask: has anyone ever heard of a savage who was living in liberty ever dreaming of 
complaining about his life and of killing himself? … On the other hand, nothing 
would have been so miserable as savage man, dazzled by enlightenment, tormented by 
passions, and reasoning about a state different from his own. (60) 
 
The Maniac, of course, has never been “savage”: he is a highly cultivated individual whose 
life has descended into what his society deems madness. But his desire to escape from 
“words” is also a desire for something like Rousseau’s somewhat idealized, pre-civilized 
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state. His longing to be somehow outside language is also a wish to be outside the social 
order in part responsible for wrecking his idealism, leading to his being rendered essentially a 
prisoner in the madhouse.  
 Jameson’s analysis of Lacan helps to accentuate the political resonances of this, and 
so to place Julian and Maddalo as a poem looking at once back to Rousseau and on toward 
Lacan. Jameson connects the Symbolic order explicitly with Rousseau, “for whom … the 
social order in all its repressiveness is intimately linked with the emergence of language 
itself.” Lacan is comparable to Rousseau here because any “Utopian” possibilities are cut off 
in Lacanian thought “by the palpable impossibility of returning to an archaic, pre-verbal stage 
of the psyche itself,” such as that imagined, if not defined or closely analysed, in the second 
Discourse. Rousseau’s account of our entry into a “civilized” social order and Lacan’s of our 
entry into the Symbolic order—the order of laws and social structures, as well as of 
language—both emphasise how these entries entail elements of violence and repression, the 
“tragic” element in the thought of each (Jameson Ideologies 91). The Maniac knows this and 
experiences its effects viscerally, expressed with force and psychological aptness as words 
burning the impossibility of his ever escaping them onto his brain. It is as if the Maniac 
experiences what Maud Ellman, referring to Lacan’s conception, calls language as “a 
sacrificial order which exacts its pound of flesh” (19-20). The division and alienation 
necessary to entering the Symbolic order is nothing less than the price of sanity in Lacan. 
This sanity, like tragedy, requires a sacrifice, which the Maniac seems to regret having made, 
and thus the Maniac’s tragedy is, in an important sense, his sanity.  Hopefully it is clear this 
does not mean that psychosis is to be understood as an ideal state, any more than Rousseau’s 
“savage” state ought to be thought of as such. Rather, it expresses how the Maniac has come 
to experience subjectivity (especially its foundation upon language) as tragedy: the nature of 
subjectivity presents itself to him as a Lacanian tragic bind, an imprisonment between what 
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have for him become two equally untenable states. This is the tragic lesson Lacan might 
teach, of the divided subject and its impossible desires—a lesson which, it seems, Shelley’s 
Maniac has learned. What effect it has had on Julian remains uncertain. The result is that 
Julian and Maddalo confronts us with an apparently pessimistic, even nihilistic view of 
language and its relationship to the psyche and the social order, which can seem definitive 
and insurmountable, suggesting in the poem a tragic limit to Julian’s utopian hopes.  
 
Tragedy and history in “The Triumph of Life” 
For Jameson, this tragic tendency suggests a political proximity between Lacan’s thought and 
the “implicit conservatism of the classical structuralist paradigm,” with its “anti-Utopian” 
tendencies (Ideologies 100), a feature of structuralism Jameson first explored in The Prison-
House of Language. Following the lead of Paul Ricoeur’s Le Conflit des interpretations, 
Jameson proposed that a key problem for structuralism is that “it remains a prisoner” to “the 
dilemmas of Kantian critical philosophy,” staging, in its conception of the split between 
signifier and signified, “essentially a replay of the Kantian dilemma of the unknowability of 
the thing-in-itself.” Although it can be argued that, strictly, the “thing-in-itself” does not exist 
for structuralism—there is no extra-linguistic order of things to which the system of linguistic 
signs refers, only the system itself—the problem remains: “this position merely displaces the 
problem from Kant to his successors in German objective idealism [e.g. Fichte] without 
solving it” (Jameson Prison-House 109-10). Major figures in the development of 
structuralism, such as Lévi-Strauss, Barthes and Althusser, all influences upon Lacan, cannot 
help presupposing, “beyond the sign-system itself, some kind of ultimate reality,” like Kant’s 
noumenal realm, “which, whether knowable or not, serves as its most distant object of 
reference” (Prison-House 214). And as Tom Eyers reminds us, it has become a common 
assumption that Lacan is “a thinker ultimately beholden, if only implicitly, to an idealist view 
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of language, defined as delimiting all that is accessible to the subject” (37). This was first 
articulated in deconstructionist fashion, in Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s essay The Title of 
the Letter, to which we will return later. Shelley has also been subject to many deconstructive 
treatments, which tend to find in his poetry various deconstructions of such an idealist view. 
The most influential is Paul de Man’s essay on “The Triumph of Life,” “Shelley Disfigured,” 
which can be connected with a psychoanalytic approach to the poem in some interesting 
ways. De Man’s reading is, of course, very well-known and has been exhaustively discussed, 
but for reasons which should soon become apparent, it is worth briefly rehearsing one of its 
main cruxes, its analysis of Shelley’s representation of Rousseau. In these lines of the poem 
(394-410)—in which Rousseau asks the “shape all light” to “Shew whence I came, and where 
I am, and why,” and receives a “new Vision” not wholly answering his questions—de Man 
focuses on the figural representation of the psychic change Rousseau describes this encounter 
as working upon him. “The scene dramatizes a failure to satisfy a desire for self-knowledge,” 
de Man writes, in which Rousseau “undergoes instead a metamorphosis in which his brain, 
the center of his consciousness, is transformed ... [This is] not an act performed by the brain, 
but the brain being acted upon by something else” (99). Comparing as Rousseau does the 
“erasure” of deer tracks upon the sand with the change in his own brain, onto which, in terms 
of this metaphor, the unsatisfactory “Vision” is then marked, de Man suggests that such 
“erasure or effacement,” represented also as the disfigurement of Rousseau’s face 
(“Triumph” 182-88), is the essence of the poem: “This trajectory from erased self-knowledge 
to disfiguration is the trajectory of The Triumph of Life” (100), a poem that unravels the 
narrator’s and Rousseau’s “quests” after knowledge by revealing their reliance upon 
linguistic processes always prone to disfiguration, sliding interminably into forms of 
regression and repetition. De Man thus reads the several questions posed by the narrator—
what is the parade of figures he sees before him, how did Rousseau’s “course begin … and 
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why?”, what is the nature of the “Shape all light” (“Triumph” 297, 352)—creating a situation 
in which question is answered by question “in infinite regress,” establishing a “movement of 
effacing and of forgetting [which] becomes prominent in the text and dispels any illusion of 
dialectical progress or regress” that might result from the series of questions the narrator 
poses. This undermines what at first appears to be a “quest” structure, similar to that of 
Alastor, Epipsychidion and Prometheus Unbound, replacing it with “something quite 
different for which we have no name readily available among the familiar props of literary 
history” (98). We see de Man’s aim: to read Shelley’s unfinished poem against “historicism,” 
and against attempts to see or to create any sense of “process” or “system” to a literary 
history of which Shelley might be made a part (122, 123). In fact for de Man, “The Triumph” 
“can be said to reduce all of Shelley’s previous work to nought” (120), since it erases any hint 
of such an attitude to history present in other of Shelley’s poems.  
 This aspect of de Man’s reading is important for us because more recently, drawing 
on the insights and conclusions of “Shelley Disfigured,” Joel Faflak has found in “The 
Triumph” a similar problematizing of the impulse to historicize, this time understood as “a 
scene of psychoanalysis that unfolds through a series of unanswered questions that stage the 
(im)possibility of historical understanding” (54). In these terms, the unanswered questions 
evoke “Freud’s interminable procedure” (57), and their presentation as part of a dialogue, 
between Rousseau and the narrator, “driven by a compulsion to re-member a lost or traumatic 
past in an indeterminate present, projected hopefully yet fearfully toward a radically 
uncertain future—is implicitly psychoanalytical” (55). Faflak evidences this by emphasizing 
a particular moment of circularity in the poem’s dialogic structure, when Rousseau asks the 
narrator to follow him: 
[“] follow thou, and from spectator turn  
    Actor or victim in this wretchedness 
 
“And what thou wouldst be taught I then may learn 
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    From thee. (305-08) 
 
For Faflak, this passage illustrates the failure of the poem’s “poetic dream” vision. Rousseau 
is going to impart knowledge to the narrator, who has requested it of him, but in so doing 
hopes to learn something from the narrator. This indicates Rousseau’s faith in historical 
progress—he expects to learn from the younger man—but also creates a (psychoanalytic) 
situation in which this faith is deconstructed: “This circular movement back to the future, 
[analogous to] the cognitive movement of psychoanalysis through its traumatic delays and 
detours, re-circuits Socratic insight through the vacillations of Lacanian desire, in which the 
past feeds upon the hope of future enlightenment” (60). Shelley’s Rousseau is thus no 
Socrates, pressing his student on, however painfully, toward greater enlightenment: he 
reveals how this understanding of progress is problematized by a Lacanian reading of our 
desire, including desire for such historical (self-) understanding, as a circular and ever-
renewing, impossible quest for satisfaction, for a truth that always eludes.  
As well as referencing de Man, this interpretation draws on Lacan’s account of trauma 
as characterized by repetition of a missed encounter with the “Real,” the notoriously elusive 
concept that forms part of Lacan’s Imaginary-Symbolic-Real triumvirate: “an appointment to 
which we are always called with a real that eludes us” (Concepts 53). This missed encounter 
“first presented itself in the history of psychoanalysis” in the form of “the trauma” (Concepts 
55) that Faflak identifies at work in the cycles and repetitions of “The Triumph of Life.” 
Dreams might provide the key to the trauma and its working through, but they never actually 
put us in touch with “the first encounter, the real, that lies behind fantasy” (Concepts 54), 
underlying the structuring of the subject (Lacan uses the German Unterlegen to describe this 
positioning of the Real). In his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan offered 
definitions of the grounding of psychoanalysis in tragic ideas and experience, in part by 
analysing Sophocles’ Oedipus, an analysis Linda Belau summarizes in terms of Lacan’s idea 
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of the traumatic missed encounter: Oedipus “misses the experience,” does not realise the 
nature of his incestuous union with his mother, “which, for him, is the constituting moment of 
his subjectivity, precisely because he is too present to the experience … It is precisely this 
relation to the missed encounter that both tragedy and psychoanalysis expose as the traumatic 
kernel of subjectivity” (Belau). Lacanian psychoanalysis, like Oedipus, “pursues a traumatic 
knowledge—an impossible recognition … something is always left undiscovered”, and 
Sophocles’ play performs “the impossibility of a total knowledge”: acknowledging this, and 
conceptualizing it in the elusiveness of the Real, psychoanalysis continually “performs its 
own failure,” giving it a fundamentally “tragic dimension,” a decidedly non-idealist aspect 
(Belau). Lacan’s own comments support this:  
To make oneself the guarantor of the possibility that a subject will in some way be 
able to find happiness even in analysis is a form of fraud … shouldn’t the true 
termination of an analysis … in the end confront the one who undergoes it with the 
reality of the human condition? (Ethics 373) 
 
This reality, it seems, is a tragic one. Moreover, it is a tragic reality that Shelley’s “Triumph” 
can seem to support. Converging the related deconstructionist and psychoanalytic approaches 
just discussed invites us to approach “history,” in ‘The Triumph’ and beyond, as akin to 
Lacan’s Real, famously (and obliquely) defined as “what resists symbolization absolutely”—
what is always missing and / or missed, in our attempts to know ourselves and the world. If 
we accept Belau’s view of psychoanalysis, which has much support from Lacan himself, we 
could add that the Real resists symbolization tragically.  
 In his recent attempt “to conceive of a positive politics of the death drive” (283), Todd 
McGowan cites one of Lacan’s “most important political statements” (6), also from the 
Ethics seminar, relevant here because it connects together tragedy, the family drama of 
psychoanalysis in Freud and Lacan, and ideas about moral and political “Good”: “The step 
taken by Freud at the level of the pleasure principle,” Lacan writes, “is to show us that there 
is no Sovereign Good—that the Sovereign Good, which is das Ding, which is the mother, is 
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also the object of incest, is a forbidden good, and that there is no other good. Such is the 
foundation of the moral law as turned on its head by Freud” (Ethics 85). Citing Lacan’s 
reading of Freud as evidence, McGowan argues that “Political theorists of all stripes write to 
change the world and assist its progression (or its return to a better state), whereas 
psychoanalysis interprets the world and uncovers the repetition at work where it seems to be 
progressing” (6), ultimately to uncover the ineluctable operations of the death drive, the 
“psychic force of repetition and negation,” increasingly the focus of the later Freud. This 
drive “undermines every attempt to construct a utopia” (283), to bring into being any form of 
new social order, the desire for which is founded on concepts like progress and the good, 
concepts which psychoanalysis thoroughly problematizes. With respect to Shelley, this 
returns us to the seeming impasse of de Man’s and Faflak’s analyses of history in “The 
Triumph,” in which Shelley’s failed vision (if that is indeed what the poem contains) 
confronts us with Faflak’s impossible quest for understanding—and also “warns us”, in de 
Man’s words, “that nothing, whether deed, word, thought, or text, ever happens in relation, 
positive or negative, to anything that precedes, follows, or exists elsewhere, but only as a 
random event whose power, like the power of death, is due to the randomness of its 
occurrence” (122). The death drive seems to be at work here, in Shelley, and as part of what 
we have been calling the tragedy of psychoanalysis.  
 At this point Fredric Jameson’s approach to the Lacanian Real, in his essay 
“Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan,” offers a possible way forward. Jameson presents 
Lacan’s “addition of the Real to a relatively harmless conceptual opposition between 
Imaginary and Symbolic,” as “scandalous to contemporary philosophy,” because it allows 
Lacanian theory the “suborn retention … of something the sophisticated philosopher was 
long since supposed to have put between parentheses, namely a conception of the referent.” 
This makes Lacan’s concept an affront to the “model-building and language-oriented 
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philosophies” Jameson refers to here, since “it is clear that there must be something 
unacceptable [to such philosophies] about this affirmation of the persistence, behind our 
representations, of that indestructible nucleus of what Lacan calls the Real”—which, Jameson 
then tellingly adds, is “simply History itself” (Ideologies 109). This move is an attempt to 
break out of the repetitious circuits that de Man and Faflak find present in “The Triumph,” by 
aligning Lacan’s theory and Marxism as materialisms allied by their shared concerns with 
forms of end-directed, hermeneutic interpretation and, ultimately, with transformation, of the 
individual and of the structure of human societies respectively. These readings of “The 
Triumph,” like Jameson’s of Lacan, are concerned with an idea of historical progress, of a 
movement toward an “end” which comprises some new form of understanding, some new 
knowledge. For de Man, this whole sense of process is illusory, a teleological projection cut 
off by close analysis of poems like “The Triumph”; for Faflak, it is similarly problematic, 
revealed by psychoanalysis as a desire to grasp something ungraspable, leaving us to 
contemplate “a radically uncertain future” (55). For Jameson, it means something different. 
As the psychoanalyst aims to bring the individual patient, however circuitously, to some new 
self-understanding, historical materialism seeks to further understand, on the plane of the 
collective, “the inexorable logic involved in the determinate failure of all the revolutions 
which have taken place in human history” (Political Unconscious 87)—the utopian goal 
being to use such understanding eventually to produce a successful one. This is something 
that Shelley was himself engaged in contemplating, particularly but not only with respect to 
the French Revolution. It also highlights perennial tensions in Lacanian thought and its 
possible applications, between a latent “idealism” with respect to language, the pronouncedly 
non-idealist, “tragic” dimension described by Belau, and an affinity with the avowedly 
utopian aims of a Marxism like Jameson’s, which are each present, in different idioms, in 
Shelley’s writings. I now want to explore this idea further, with reference to Prometheus 
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Unbound, to show how we might move our comparisons between Lacan and Shelley in a less 
tragic direction, contrasting with (and perhaps contradicting) some of the readings above. 
 
Learning about love in Prometheus Unbound 
In the “Lacan” essay, Jameson describes how the first notable synthesis of Marxism and 
psychoanalysis, by Wilhelm Reich in the 1920s, arose in response to and “addressed the 
sense that political revolution cannot be fulfilled until the very character structures inherited 
from the older, prerevolutionary society, and reinforced by its instinctual taboos, have been 
utterly transformed in their turn” (Ideologies 82). This summary of Reich’s perspective could 
be an effective gloss for two of Shelley’s most ambitious poems, Laon and Cythna and 
Prometheus Unbound. Both of these works and their respective Prefaces address the issue of 
a transformation in “character,” in the minds of the people who will bring the revolution into 
being, preceding the “political,” collective and structural transformation of society. Laon and 
Cythna is presented to us as “an experiment on the temper of the public mind,” which Shelley 
then qualifies by directing it more toward “the enlightened and refined” (Works 130; my 
italics)—those among Shelley’s contemporaries who might be sympathetic toward the 
poem’s radicalism, without taking it as provocation for a violent revolution of the type which 
failed in France, because so many of its participants “were incapable of conducting 
themselves with the wisdom and tranquillity of freemen so soon as some of their fetters were 
partially loosened” (131). Laon and Cythna has also, however, been fashioned as “a story of 
human passion in its most universal character”, appealing “to the common sympathies of 
every human breast” (130). From these brief quotations, we get a sense of the importance of 
this tension in Shelley between his writing as directed toward a small number of individual 
minds already capable of receiving it as he intends, and the ambition to speak to “every 
human breast,” to participate in effecting a successful revolutionary transformation on a 
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collective level, by appealing to and, crucially, educating us in the “common sympathies” we 
share.  
 Paul Hamilton has interpreted Shelley’s writings as consistently engaged with this 
tension: the “enlightenment and refinement” of the audience to which Shelley sometimes 
appeals, “are functions of their poetic sympathy, and so designate membership of that 
disposable vanguard class that extends through revolutionary thought from Marx to Lenin 
and Gramsci” (36). Two “analogies of structure” between Marxism and psychoanalysis, 
observed by Jameson, thus stand out as especially relevant to Shelley: their shared concerns 
with “the role and risks of the concept of a ‘midwife’ of truth, whether analyst or vanguard 
party,” and also “the paradox of the end of the revolutionary process, which, like analysis, 
must surely be considered ‘interminable’ rather than ‘terminable’” (Ideologies 108). In 
Shelley, the role of the poet and of the poetry he creates is analogous (or very close) to that of 
Jameson’s psychoanalysts and members of the Marxian vanguard class, in their roles as 
Socratic midwives of truth. His poetry (like Jameson’s theory) is deeply concerned with the 
links between two levels of interpretation and analysis—the interrelated levels of psyche and 
society, individual and collective. Some of Shelley’s poems might even be read as allegories 
of the relationship between these levels, and thus as explorations of the preconditions 
necessary for the realization of the types of revolutionary transformations his poetry 
imagines, and wants to participate in. Shelley’s poet and his works, ideally, would bridge the 
gap between the focus of the analyst (the human mind), and that of the (Marxist) 
revolutionary (the structure of society). In A Defence of Poetry, Shelley defines such an effect 
on consciousness as a key function of “Poetry”: “The most unfailing companion, and 
follower of the awakening of a great people to work a beneficial change in opinion or 
institution, is Poetry” (Works 700-01). The “people” need to be “great” before such a change 
can take place, and Poetry is vital to this; it not only “follows” such broader historical 
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patterns and developments, it affects them by “awakening” the individuals involved to their 
power to work such a change, on the level of collective attitudes (“opinion”), or of 
institutions. Of course, the difficulty of finding a way across this chasm between mind and 
world, in politically effective ways, is exactly what has produced a very extensive Marxist-
psychoanalytic literature, much of which can today appear either as wildly utopian (for some 
readers, for instance, Reich’s and Marcuse’s work on sexuality and revolution), or as having 
played out its political hand decades previously. As we see from works like “The Triumph of 
Life,” Shelley is himself alive to and troubled by the difficulty of apprehending such 
relationships, faced with the sheer intractability of history and the human mind discretely, let 
alone as they weave intricately with one another. It is certainly a topic that cannot fail to 
bring us, in the words of Shelley’s fragmentary “On Life,” to “that verge where words 
abandon us,” as we “look down the dark abyss of—how little we know” (Works 636), into the 
space, we might say, of the Lacanian Real. Starting from this vertiginous point, I want now to 
suggest a way in which reading Prometheus Unbound with Lacan, and Jameson, allows us to 
convert what might be a “tragic” experience of the limits of language and communication, 
into a more positive, energizing moment of poetic vision—and also brings into focus what 
problems may arise, in making such an interpretive move.  
Let us first consider some of these problems. Some readers, including those generally 
sympathetic to Shelley’s writing, have taken issue with Prometheus Unbound, and 
particularly with the lyrical visions of Act 4. We can find, behind some of these issues, 
tensions in Lacanian thought intersecting with those in Shelley’s reworking of Aeschylus’ 
tragic plot, along Platonic lines. Lacan’s eighth seminar, Transference, revolves, like Freud’s 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, around a reading of Plato’s Symposium, which Shelley 
translated in 1818. As Jean-Michel Rabaté points out, recalling Socrates’ statement in the 
dialogue that “Love is the only thing in the world that I understand” (Plato 532), Lacan said 
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of his own position as analyst: “I am not there, in the final analysis, for a person’s own good, 
but in order that he love. Does this mean that I must teach him [the patient] how to love? 
Clearly it seems difficult to avoid this necessity” (Transference 15). Rabaté has suggested 
that, for Lacan, the Symposium presents “love” as “structured like a metaphor, since it tends 
to raise some object to the dignity of the precious part or symbol replacing the lacking object 
of desire” (Socrates is described, metaphorically, by Alcibiades, as possessing such precious 
parts, the agalmata, inside him). “There is an essential substitution at work here,” Rabaté 
writes, “and it is often either poetry or theology that can systematize such a substitution” 
(141). This has certain parallels with the problems some readers have had with Prometheus 
Unbound, negatively characterizing its final Act itself as a kind of unsatisfactory 
metaphorical substitution for an object of desire—the revolutionary change it holds out hope 
for in the real world—and perhaps therefore as poetry that comes uncomfortably close to 
theology, and / or to some form of philosophical-linguistic idealism. For instance, Hamilton 
suggests that, “for Prometheus Unbound to convince, there has to be an almost religious 
confidence in the power to transform individual loss into public good” (50): for Nigel Leask, 
the “dialogic energy” of the drama is “dispersed,” detrimentally, by Act 4 (150); and Gelpi 
takes issue with this Act’s imagining freedom on a cosmic scale, arguing that this “presents 
nothing like the difficulty involved in imagining a world of harmonious, just, and equable 
human beings” (263). One of Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s main critiques of Lacan is 
pertinent here. They write that “Lacan tirelessly adapts his discourse, in all sorts of ways, to 
the possibility of a representation, a true adequate representation of that very thing which 
challenges and exceeds representation”: this creates the “ambiguity in Lacan’s work between 
the daring movement of the invention of a language, of a writing, and the constant desire to 
found a language of truth—in order to found, on the basis of the latter, a magister and an 
institution under whose authority a cure could be placed” (xxx). In his challenging, 
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defamiliarizing uses of language, allegory and metaphor, especially in what Leask terms the 
“increasing lyrical abstraction” of Acts 3 and 4 (150), Shelley might be accused of something 
similar: daringly and inventively seeking what Keach, referring to the Maniac, calls 
“language that wants to function as sublime emotional music” (90), an impulse which Julian 
and Maddalo presents as a potential threat or limit to the communication of the poet’s ideas, 
to an audience beyond “the more select classes of poetical readers” (Preface to Prometheus 
Unbound; Works 232), or perhaps in any politically effective manner. Going further in Nancy 
and Lacoue-Labarthe’s direction, Shelley’s most daring poetical moment, his attempt to 
figure the revolutionary process itself, risks undermining the very radicalism it wants to 
promote, with its recourse to the only option it (or any other piece of writing, for that matter) 
has open to it: substituting a metaphor for the thing itself, limited language for real 
revolution, which resides in the space of Lacan’s Real, demanding but always exceeding 
representation.  
 Seen in this way, Prometheus Unbound moves precariously between an opening out 
into the world beyond the poem, ascribing to its readers the responsibility for driving that 
process forward, and an idealist / theological institution of the authority of its own conception 
of that process, which it asks us to accept as “truth.” Shelley’s drama thus takes risks akin to 
those of Lacanian theory, containing within it similar problems of tragedy and idealism, 
balancing out its radical potential. This could open up further problems for us, regarding the 
role of Demogorgon in particular. In terms recalling Everest’s and Keach’s discussions of the 
failures of communication in Julian and Maddalo, Hamilton writes that the closing lines of 
Act 4, spoken by Demogorgon—in which, for example, he implores us in Christ-like 
language, “To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite; / To forgive wrongs darker than death 
or night,” and ‘to hope, till Hope creates / From its own wreck the thing it contemplates” 
(4.570-74)—highlight a “crisis in communication he has represented throughout Prometheus 
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Unbound,” and so at least since he first appears in Act 2, if not before. For Hamilton, the 
problem is that, “Quite how ‘hope’ keeps its meaning here is baffling. That a transformation 
rather than an obliteration of its significance awaits it is the poem’s great article of faith” 
(50). Further uncertainties and anxieties that have been raised regarding Demogorgon’s 
function suggest themselves: for instance, Thomas R. Frosch’s Lacanian suggestion that 
“Demogorgon exists in Shelley not only because Shelley senses an otherness in our existence 
but because Shelley wants there to be a helping power outside us,” a helping power which, 
however, throughout embodies a “potentially destructive energy [which] must be put to 
creative use” (170). This refers to the links often made by critics between Demogorgon and 
the idea of “Necessity,” first suggested by Mary Shelley’s “Note” to Prometheus Unbound, in 
which she calls him “the Primal Power of the world” (qtd. in Duffy 236 n. 55). Cian Duffy 
reads this in explicitly political terms, writing that “the dénouement of Shelley’s drama is 
dominated by familiar anxieties about the role of popular violence in effecting political 
change, about the ‘awful’ relationship between Necessity and revolution” (150) 
(Demogorgon is referred to as an “Awful shape” by Jupiter at 3.1.51). Duffy thus suggests 
that the vision of progress that the drama strives to depict is problematized by Demogorgon’s 
crucial role in it, and by his final voicing of its vision, behind which lurks the possibility that 
“violent revolutionary retribution may be the ‘awful’ means by which Necessity will reform 
the world” (25).  
 It may seem, therefore, that even the ending of Shelley’s most radically optimistic 
work, with its vision of the role of hope and love in human progress and betterment, is 
haunted by a power it cannot get on terms with and control, the potentially violent and 
destructive power of Demogorgon. There is, however, another Lacan-inflected way to 
approach Prometheus Unbound, which might show Shelley’s risks in representing this vision 
as rewarded. This involves focusing on another key part of Shelley’s lyrical drama, and 
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indeed one of the interpretive cruxes of Shelley’s poetry more generally, Demogorgon’s 
dialogue with Asia in Act 2. This central scene looks forward, in part, to the similar, 
unanswered question motif developed in “The Triumph of Life,” but here this is used by 
Shelley in a different way. In response to Asia’s questionings about Jupiter, Demogorgon 
refers to the “deep truth,” much discussed in Shelley criticism, which is “imageless,” which 
cannot be imaged, or spoken, or sung. The lines are worth quoting at length: 
Asia.  Who is master of the slave?  
 
Demogorgon.     If the abysm    
   Could vomit forth its secrets: — but a voice     
   Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless; 
   For what would it avail to bid thee gaze  
   On the revolving world? What to bid speak 
   Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change? To these 
   All things are subject but eternal Love.    
   
Asia.  So much I asked before, and my heart gave 
   The response thou hast given; and of such truths 
   Each to itself must be the oracle.   (2.4.114-23) 
 
Demogorgon discourages Asia from her impossible wish for a full knowledge of the world 
(the universe, even) and its processes, Asia’s wish for an encounter with what Lacan would 
call the Real. Crucially, Demogorgon does not insist upon this as an encounter tragically 
missing and / or missed: he turns Asia away from such questionings, suggesting they are 
needless, directing her instead to contemplate the role of “eternal Love.” Asia then recognizes 
that she has intuited the nature of this role before: it is a truth already known, inscribed in 
what the Preface to Julian and Maddalo calls “the text of every heart” (Works 213). It is a 
truth available, potentially, to all of us, of which Demogorgon is the midwife.  
 A response to this is crucial for any interpretation of Prometheus Unbound. Further 
psychoanalytic possibilities of the scene are pointed to by Hamilton, who suggests that, “On a 
Freudian reading, Demogorgon is the Oedipal structure rather than an Oedipal character: the 
precondition of the possibility for any ego-formation at all, not a figure in the Greek story” 
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(48) that Shelley’s lyrical drama reworks. On a Lacanian reading this puts him on terms with 
“lack”: his voiceless and imageless deep truth is what we are always without, opening up an 
“infinite regress” of questionings, all asked by Asia (“Who is [Jupiter’s] master? Is he too a 
slave?”; “Whom called’st thou God?”; “Who is the master of the slave?”) (2.4.109-14), 
calling to mind de Man’s and Faflak’s readings of “The Triumph of Life.” The tragic 
dimension of psychoanalysis again begins to assert itself, but in this case is counteracted and 
transformed, as Shelley’s drama as a whole transforms the Aeschylean tragedy of 
Prometheus’ imprisonment into a lyrical vision of his unbinding. Hamilton suggests that “The 
only escape from this infinite regress is to accept that, like the shapeless Demogorgon”—
comparable to the “Shape all light” in “The Triumph”—“‘the deep truth is imageless’ 
(2.4.116), and cannot be understood in the way a subject knows or masters an object or 
individual” (48). The deep truth referred to here is best understood not in the sense of an 
objective set of conditions, a reality beyond our perception, as in Kant for instance: it is 
presented, rather, as an immanent process of knowing in which Asia becomes engaged, and 
in which we are all invited to participate. It cannot be imaged or articulated because, like the 
Lacanian Real, it exists only in relation to the process that it is itself involved in, as a 
constituent part. It cannot be grasped, and therefore cannot be “mastered,” because, as 
Demogorgon intimates, no meta- position is available outside of that process. This invocation 
of the Real carries us also toward Jameson’s thought, this time the space of his Political 
Unconscious, “a space in which History,” which we have seen Jameson equate with the Real, 
“itself becomes the ultimate ground as well as the untranscendable limit of our 
understanding” (86). In these Jamesonian terms, “History” is “the experience of Necessity” as 
“the inexorable form of events” (87), a notion Jameson derives by elaborating upon 
“Althusser’s antiteleological formula for history (neither a subject nor a telos), based as it is 
on Lacan’s notion of the Real as ‘that which resists symbolization absolutely’ and on 
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Spinoza’s idea of the ‘absent cause’” (19-20). “Conceived in this way,” Jameson writes, 
“History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well 
as collective praxis,” a History that ‘can be apprehended only through its effects, and never 
directly as some reified force” (88). This suggests, I think, the proper function of 
Demogorgon, hinting as he does toward the political unconscious—or perhaps, to be more 
exact, Shelley’s politicization of the unconscious—in Prometheus Unbound. The “deep truth” 
he turns Asia away from might be Lacan’s Real, Spinoza’s absent cause, Althusser’s or 
Jameson’s “History,” and this is Shelley’s major insight. All of these are names for the 
ungraspable: that which always elides us, leaving a gap in our knowledge and placing a limit 
upon our desire, which psychoanalysis has tended to conceive of in the tragic terms we have 
outlined. Bearing these ideas in mind, I want to make a final suggestion as to how we might 
use them, to produce a different reading of these key sections of Prometheus Unbound, 
beginning with some brief reference back to Plato. 
 Contrasting Shelley’s translation of the Symposium and Benjamin Jowett’s widely 
read, Victorian version, Michael O’Neill notes a difference in their renderings of Diotima’s 
account of universal beauty, which is suggestive here. Shelley’s version describes how the 
initiate might learn to ‘steadily contemplate’ this form, whereas in Jowett’s, it is a “vision” 
that is “revealed” (243). The point of the dialogue between Demogorgon and Asia in Act 2 is 
precisely that no such vision is revealed to Asia, only the importance of “eternal Love” is 
pointed toward, intuited, felt rather seen. The dialogue works a change in Asia, which 
Panthea observes affecting the external world: “Some good change / Is working in the 
elements which suffer / Thy presence thus unveiled” (2.5.18-20). This unveiling (an image 
with Platonic resonances), which Panthea gives as evidence that it is not “I alone, / Thy sister, 
thy companion, thine own chosen one, / But the whole world which seeks thy sympathy” 
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(2.5.31-33), leads to another key moment in Asia’s steady, gradual realization of the nature of 
love’s role in the drama’s revolutionary process: 
   all love is sweet,  
Given or returned. Common as light is love,  
And its familiar voice wearies not ever. 
Like the wide heaven, the all-sustaining air, 
It makes the reptile equal to the God (2.4.40-44) 
 
One of the ambitious goals of Prometheus Unbound is to teach us such a lesson in the 
importance of this love, by engaging us with it directly—by making us “feel,” not “see” it, as 
Panthea comments of Asia (2.5.17)—in the dialogues through which Asia herself gradually 
intuits a meaning to Demogorgon’s words. The revolutionary process, of which these lessons 
in love form part, is imagined as never-ending: it relies upon a vision of a utopian goal to 
sustain its energy and optimism, but must in fact be understood as interminable, like the 
process of self-understanding that psychoanalysis tries to set in motion. The final Act can also 
be approached in this way. Shelley offers us no kind of religious revelation: he implicates us 
in a process, one which may be interminable, but which is driven vitally on by the act of 
imagining it, as Asia begins to do as she discourses on love. The abysm that Demogorgon 
refers to in Act 2 might be Shelley’s “dark abyss of—how little we know,” over the “verge 
where words abandon us” in “On Life.” But this “void abysm” returns in Act 4 as the space, 
“the deep,” into which “Heaven’s despotism” and “Conquest” are going to fall, after which 
“Love from its awful throne of patient power / in the wise heart” is imagined to “spring” into 
the world (4.554-60). We might think of this ending not as reliant upon a series of dubious 
metaphorical substitutions, but as the culmination rather of one elaborate metaphor, on the 
level of the drama’s structure, upon which it stakes its success: Prometheus Unbound itself as 
a bridge spanning the abysm, between the “Love” it wants its reader to be educated in, as a 
concept, and the actual experience of it in the world—and between the individual psyche that 
comprehends, and itself depends on such metaphoric substitutions for its very structure 
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(according to Lacan), and the greater, collective, revolutionary processes that the drama’s 
metaphors try to figure for us.  
 This is a particularly hopeful and sympathetic reading of Prometheus Unbound, and 
one which resists some tendencies in the psychoanalytic thought that has helped us to 
illuminate some of Shelley’s writings. It presents Prometheus Unbound as resistant to the 
tragic dimension of psychoanalysis, since Shelley’s lyrical drama is grounded upon the 
notion that our lack of ability to grasp the “deep truth,” which we have sometimes equated 
with Lacan’s Real, is a potential virtue, instead of or as well as a definitive limitation. 
Accepting this condition, Shelley suggests, is in fact a method of resistance to the tyranny 
and desire for mastery represented by Jupiter. This is also a final point upon which Shelley 
and Lacan might agree rather than diverge. For Yannis Stravrakakis, though Lacan’s thought 
is certainly not “utopian,” because “The elimination of lack through a definite symbolisation 
of the real is impossible,” it contains nevertheless a radical potential analogous to Shelley’s 
insight: our inability to grasp the Real, to image or voice Shelley’s deep truth, is not 
necessarily a tragic limitation, it also “is the condition of possibility of our freedom because it 
means that no order, no matter how repressive it might be, can acquire a stable character” 
(95). This helps to explain why cultivating “a sympathetic attitude that renounces selfishness 
or the (pre-Oedipal) idea that the world is at our disposal” (Hamilton 48) is key to 
Prometheus Unbound. Such selfishness is shown to stem from the impossible desire to master 
the world absolutely, Jupiter’s fantasy of an “omnipotent,” stable, undivided self, living in a 
world “subdued to me” (3.1.3-4), a world of plenitude and absolute power. Whereas, we 
realise, his identity in fact relies upon that Other, who is Prometheus. Repressive orders and 
their projects of mastery, allegorized by Jupiter, cannot subdue the resistance of the deep 
truth / Real, which opens “the cut of dislocation threatening all symbolisations of the social, 
to the ultimate subversion of any sedimentation of political reality” (Stavrakakis 75). 
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Stavrakakis calls this “cut,” “The moment of the political” itself, “the moment of contingency 
and undecidability marking the gap between the dislocation of one socio-political 
identification and the creation of the desire for a new one” (75). It is such a moment that 
Shelley dramatizes in Prometheus Unbound, offering, as it does, through its vision of the 
subversion of Jupiter’s order, an allegory of the non-violent defeat of such tyrannical powers. 
In so doing, it provides us with a dialectical balance to the darker reflections of poems like 
Julian and Maddalo and “The Triumph of Life,” which explore challenging problems that 
Lacan’s theories would later confront, particularly regarding the role of language in the 
creation of subjectivity, and in communication, especially, for Shelley, of political ideas and 
ideals. These other poems prefigure certain aspects of the tragic dimension of psychoanalysis, 
undermining utopian political projects—Prometheus Unbound suggests a way in which this 
tragedy might be understood differently and so transformed, its problems and contradictions 
themselves containing a radical potential, waiting to be uncovered by analysis. 
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